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Introduction
Kenya’s return to multi-party politics in 1991 has been defined by campaigns 
for democracy and human rights, the intensification of politicization of 
ethnic difference or ethnicization of political differences, intense political 
competition state power, cyclical political violence, mass murder, rape, de-
struction, displacement and land dispossessions. Moreover, Kenya’s general 
elections, except the 2002 and 2013, have been characterized by waves of po-
litical violence of varying regional intensity. The Rift Valley, however, more 
than any other location, including the Coast Province, has experienced the 
most frequent and intense forms of the elections related violence.
These waves of violence beg several questions: why has the Rift Valley 
has been the epicenter of Kenya’s election-related political violence? What 
distinguishes the Rift Valley land question from the Coastal land question? 
To what extent does the unresolved question of the land, the land past and 
present pastoralist communities lost to the European settlement schemes 
and the contested Kenyatta (independence) era re-settlement schemes, ac-
count for the violence in the Rift Valley? To what extent does the British 
and the Kenyatta government’s Mau Mau counter-insurgency strategies 
and economic policies account for these waves of violence?1 To what extent 
does the explicit and implicit colonial and independent governments’ sed-
entary agrarian biases against the pastoralist mode of production explain 
the silences on the pastoralist communities claims for restorative justice 
in the wider debate on land, dispossession and displacement in the Rift 
Valley? What types of justice questions do these conflicts raise?
1 Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Insurgency, Civil War and Decolonization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
MISR WP 24 Akoko.indd   2 15/10/2015   09:22
3
Political Violence and General Elections in Kenya
In October 1991, a new wave of violence that was variously been labeled 
“land clashes,” “ethnic violence,” “tribal clashes,” and “ethnic cleansing,” 
hit the communities who were living in the then Rift Valley Province and 
along the borders Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western provinces perceived to 
be supporting political movements opposed to the KANU one-party state in 
the struggle for the return of the multi-party system of government. In the 
Rift Valley, this wave of violence continued, intermittently, until 1998, while 
the Coast Province experienced in the run-up to the 1997 General Election 
to 1998.
The vast media reports and the official commission of inquiries sug-
gest that gangs, armed with bows, arrows, spears, Molotov cocktails, and 
sometimes guns, whose real identity or identities remains disputed, per-
petrated the first wave of violence with the complicity of the security of-
ficers of the Daniel Moi’s government. These reports also suggested that 
Daniel Moi’s government instigated the violence, Kalenjin elites and some 
of Kalenjin peasants who continue to occupy or use the lands left vacant 
by those displaced were the primary beneficiary of its short-term and long-
term consequences.2
Subsequently, Kenya witnessed other waves of political violence, sim-
ilar to the first, in the run up to the general elections of 1997, in the then 
Rift Valley and the Coast Provinces, and after the disputed presidential 
election of 2007. In 1997 political violence, the Rift Valley and at the Coast, 
were centers of political violence. The violence at the Coast targeted most-
ly peasants and workers, from Kenya’s hinterland, who had emigrated to 
work in the plantation farms, hotels and the docks of Mombasa and per-
ceived to be pro-opposition. Both Rift Valley and the Coastal Province have 
a long history of land displacement and dispossession and are home to 
some of the most contested independent era settlement schemes.
However, unlike the first wave of violence, the political violence in 
2007/8 was swift, more widespread and socially intimate: various urban 
and rural locations within six out of eight of the then Kenyan administra-
tive provinces experienced the violence. Only the North Eastern and East-
2 The Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and other 
Parts of Kenya, 1992 (The Kiliku Report), Government of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission 
Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer, 2002 (The 
Akiwumi Report); and Government of Kenya, Commission of Inquiry Into Post Election 
Violence. Nairobi: Government Printer, 2008(The Waki Report). Prisca Kamungi provides 
higher figures, which contest the official report’s. However, unlike the Waki Report, Kamungi 
does not account for how she arrives at higher figures from the government, Kenya Red 
Cross, and the United Nation Sources.
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ern Provinces did not experience the violence. The Commission of Inquiry 
into the Post Election Violence, an official report, suggests that at least 1,113 
persons were killed, the Kenyan security forces killing 405 person, and cit-
izen on citizen violence accounting for about 728 deaths.3 Rift Valley ac-
counted for highest number of reported deaths, injuries and displacement. 
The report also notes that about 350,000 persons were displaced and about 
1,916 sought refugee in Uganda.4
The 2007/8 wave of political violence set neighbors against neigh-
bor. It targeted government installations in the Orange Democratic Move-
ment’s strongholds. It also led to the deep politicization of everyday mar-
ket relations and exchanges: the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
launched a bitter consumer boycott of good and services whose providers 
were perceived to be pro-Party of National Unity (PNU), some PNU landlords 
in Nairobi’s low income houses and slum lords evicting their tenants per-
ceived to pro-ODM, while some ODM slum dwellers refused to pay rents to 
the slumlords or evicted slumlords perceived to be pro-PNU.
Therefore, Kenya’s transition from the authoritarian one-party state, 
through multi-party politics, to a new constitutional order has been violent 
and bloody. However, various academic and human rights advocacy ex-
planations, which look at the political violence in the Rift Valley through 
humanitarianism lenses, have focused mostly on the present claims and 
demands for justice, on the one hand. On the other, some of the academ-
ic literature which historicizes the political violence have examine only 
the Kalenjin’s past historical injustice and the political claims, and not the 
claims of other pastoralist communities of the Rift Valley counties and the 
political subjectivities it has engendered and the politics of it enables and 
constrains in contemporary Kenya.5
Arguably, these studies, too, have not paid sufficient attention to sig-
nificance of the past and the present pastoralist communities’ claims of loss 
land, fear of economic and political marginalization and historical injus-
tice, the explicit or implicit sedentary agrarian biases that occlude mean-
ingful engagement with these pastoralist claims.
Prisca Kamungi, for example, discusses the pastoralist land question 
merely as a background to the present humanitarian crisis, and a crisis that 
3 Government of Kenya, 2008: 331
4 Government of Kenya, 2008: 352
5 See Gabriella Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. Chicago: University 
of Chicago, 2011, and Karuti Kanyinga, “The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, 
Ethnicity and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya,” Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 27 (3), 2009: 325-344.
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calls for state intervention.6 However, Kamungi is silent on the justice ques-
tions on the historical injustices of the pastoralist communities and makes 
no recommendation on how it should be redressed. Kamungi also does 
not pay attention the impact of the ingrained sedentary agriculture bias, a 
bias that always talks about the land in the Rift Valley only as ‘arable,’7 and 
legitimates political claims of sedentary farmers. It, however, de-legitima-
tizes the pastoralist land claims for justice for past and independent era 
historical injustices. 8
The official, and the various unofficial reports on the violence suggest 
that the peasants and farm workers of the Rift Valley were the primary vic-
tims of the violence, in the 1991-1998 wave. In the 2007/8, the second wave 
of violence, which affected the rural and urban locations, peasants, farm 
workers, petty-traders and wholesalers, the urban-poor and other workers 
perceived to belong to or sympathetic to either the Party of National Unity 
or the Orange Democratic Movement, were the main target of the violence.
The political violence was both spontaneous and organized.9 The vi-
olence in its organized form was mostly perpetrated by the state securi-
ty agents, state security agents and militia groups, acting on behalf of the 
Party of National Unity, on the one hand, and various militia groups in the 
Rift Valley and urban slums allied to politicians in the Orange Democratic 
Movement, on the other. The peasants and the urban poor of the farms in 
the Rift Valley, and the slums of the Kenyan towns of Eldoret, Kisumu and 
Nairobi, respectively, more than any other classes, bore the brunt of the 
2007-8 political violence.
This paper seeks to explore the type of politics that the historical in-
justice of present and past pastoralist communities of the Rift Valley ena-
bles and the liberal democratic politics it constrains. It looks at how the 
interplay between class and ethnicity has defined politics and violence in 
the Rift Valley, how the nature of the leading Rift Valley elites’ political alli-
ances define the contours of the political violence or bargains and conces-
sions from Kenya’s body politics, but falls short of demanding distributive 
and reparative justice for the past and present pastoralists communities 
they represent. It largely focuses on the early 1990s political violence in the 
Rift Valley that fundamentally redefined political competition in Kenya.
6 Prisca Mbura Kamungi, “The Politics of Displacement in Multi-Party Kenya,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27 (3) 2009: 345-364.
7 Prisca Mbura Kamungi, “The Politics of Displacement in Multi-Party Kenya,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27 (3) 2009: 346.
8 Human Rights Watch 1993, 2008
9 Government of Kenya, 2008.
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It also attempts a discourse analysis of some of the media reportage 
and seminal documents that have shaped the discussion of the violence 
and demands for justice. It is organized as follows: first, the paper exam-
ines some academic and human rights discourses on the violence in the 
Rift Valley. Second, the paper examines the political violence that came to 
be variously known as ‘land clashes,’ ‘tribal clashes,’ ‘ethnic violence,’ ‘eth-
nic cleansing’ or ‘political violence.’ It looks at what the official government 
explanation and dissenting views on the violence says, reveals and elides 
about the political significance of the violence.
The paper historicizes the creation of settlement schemes vis-à-vis 
the pastoralist communities’ claims of land injustices. It also examines the 
sedentary agrarian ideological biases, which continue to delegitimize the 
Rift Valley pastoralist communities’ land claims. Lastly, the paper briefly 
looks at what the political contestations and violence, during the transi-
tion to multi-party and democratization, has produced in Kenya vis-à-vis 
the political demands of the pastoralist communities: the Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010.
The constitution of Kenya, 2010, stands out as a bold attempt to deal 
with the land and ethnic questions that underpin the deadly violence of 
the Rift Valley province, through the two-tier system of government, na-
tional and county, and other provisions. However, this bold attempts to re-
dress the centrifugal forces of politicized ethno-regional marginalization 
and inequalities, historical land injustice, and ethnic discrimination was 
rejected by the Kalenjins generally, led by William Ruto, and Daniel Moi, 
and some Christian clergy, notably those, allied to the National Council of 
Churches of Kenya, in the 2010 national referendum.
I argue that the present claims for restorative and redistributive jus-
tice by the past and the present pastoralist communities rest on the claims 
over the land they lost to European settler agriculture, the fabled game 
reserves such as Amboseli or Maasai Mara and the independent era settle-
ment schemes. The independent era land redistribution was informed by 
the British and the Kenyatta counterinsurgency strategy that sought to un-
dermine the political base of the militant Mau Mau nationalist and radical 
nationalist who favored the nationalization of the White Highland and its 
redistribution to the landless.
This strategy, coupled with sedentary agrarian biases against the pas-
toralist, favored mostly the multi-ethnic Kenya elites (the nationalist with 
few exceptions such as Bildad Kaggia and Joseph Murumbi), the commu-
nities (the Luo, Meru Luhya and the Kisii), and notably, the Kikuyu, who 
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were in better represented in Kenyatta’s government, the European set-
tlers who stayed on after independence and the Multi-National Compa-
nies. The pastoralist communities, especially the Maasai, the Saboats and 
the Nandi, whose claims to these lands as ‘ancestral lands,” were the most 
disadvantaged by the settlement schemes.
This counterinsurgency strategy spawned a multi-ethnic Kenya elites, 
including the Kalenjin and the Maasai, with vested interest in unequal land 
ownership and control of state power as the only guarantee against the 
landless. The Kalenjin elites, especially Daniel Moi, who had acquiesced to 
the Kenyatta’s regime consolidation strategy, more allies from the Coastal 
and other parts of the Rift Valley, traded off land for the ultimate political 
prize: state power. The non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai peasants could keep 
their lands as long as the Kalenjin elite and their allies kept state power.
Arguably, the successive Rift Valley political elites, apart from Jean 
Marie Seroney, William Murgor and Chelegat Mutai, as Lynch suggests, 
have not only used the unresolved pastoralists land claims and social jus-
tice questions as a resource for constructing a historical, political and mor-
al community, but also extracting political concessions from Kenya’s body 
politics. However, even when in power, these elites have not proposed a 
non-violent alternative on how the pastoralist land claims and historical 
injustices alongside the social justice claims of those displaced and dis-
posed by the cyclical waves of election-related political violence should be 
redressed.
Thus, in 1991, the pastoralist communities, namely the Maasai and 
the Kalenjin, claims of historical land included but were not limited to the 
smallholder lands of the independent era settlement schemes. However, 
the Moi regime successfully contested only the smallholder lands owned 
by non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai peasants. In doing so, the Moi regime par-
ried both internal (Rift Valley) threat and external (national) threat to the 
regime. The Moi regime successfully turned a growing restlessness by the 
landless in the Rift Valley, from an inter-class conflict between the large 
land owning multi-ethnic Kenyan and the Multi-National Companies, into 
an intra-ethnic land conflict amongst the peasants and the landless.
Externally, the violence as part and parcel of a wider strategy to con-
tain the opposition ensured that the opposition the opposition politics was 
largely confined to the urban areas and electoral threat to Moi’s hold on 
power was substantially reduced. The bloody multi-party political strug-
gles spawned a strong human rights and democracy movement, which 
culminated in the enactment of a new constitution on the one hand, and 
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on the other hand, as Kamungi notes, the displacements and politicization 
of ethnic differences spawned social movements such as the Mungiki, or 
the Saboat Land Defence Force (SDLF), and one can add, the Mombasa Re-
publican Council (MRC), whose initial goal was to reclaims lost “ancestral 
lands” in the Central Province, Bungoma, and Coastal strip, respectively.10 
However, these movements turned into violent and criminal outfits, ter-
rorizing the very communities they claim they belonged to or seek to lib-
erate or like Mungiki, gangs for hire by Kenyan political elites in deadly 
political contests.
Discourses on Political Violence in Kenya
Some academic literature on property rights, such as Onoma’s11 and some 
influential the international human rights advocacy literature on political 
violence in Kenya, such as the Human Rights Watch, and Kamungi,12 have 
foregrounded the questions of humanitarianism, property and justice for 
the present victims of violence, respectively, as entry point into under-
standing the political violence in Kenya’s Rift Valley counties. However, 
these approaches, arguably, have not sufficiently historicized the pastoral-
ist communities’ land question as a question of restorative and distributive 
justice to be considered alongside other claims for justice.
These studies have also not paid sufficient attention to the intri-
cate interconnection between the control of state power, the colonial and 
post-colonial counterinsurgency against the Mau Mau movement for land 
and freedom, and the interplay between ethnicity, class formations and 
struggles. These studies have tended to place emphasis mostly on the more 
recent dimensions of political violence: humanitarian crises, the ethnicity 
of the alleged perpetrators of the violence and its victims, the plight and 
the social justice questions of the recently displaced and disposed, proper-
ty rights and restitution.
Moreover, these studies have ignored the significance of the nature 
of the citizenship crises, the competing political communities, forms of 
political organizations, and political consciousness that the failure of the 
successive government to redress the political fears of the pastoralist com-
munities, the communities that lost the largest piece of land and way of life 
to settlers’ sedentary agriculture, has produced.
10 Kamungi, 2009: 360.
11 Ato Kwanema Onoma. The Politics of Property Rights in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015.
12 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya. New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 1993, and Kamungi, 2009.
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That is, these studies, too, have not paid sufficient attention to the po-
litical crisis the break down of the elite political consensus between Daniel 
Arap Moi and Jomo Kenyatta, a consensus that allowed Jomo Kenyatta to 
export Central Kenya’s, and some of the densely populated locations so-
cial crisis into the Rift Valley, has produced. The Kenyatta era settlement 
schemes were only a safety valve that eased the social crises brought about 
by establishment of ‘the White Highlands,’ the alienation of land for sed-
entary agriculture, and the Mau Mau war of resistance. These settlement 
schemes, rather than redressing the land question, compounded the social 
justice question and its politics during the authoritarian one-party state 
system.
Arguably, these studies, too, have ignored the political claims that 
the ingrained sedentary agricultural biases of the successive colonial and 
post-independent governments legitimates or delegitimizes, and how the 
Kalenjin, and the Maasai elites have deftly deployed the unresolved histor-
ical land injustices to build a political constituency and extract significant 
political concessions from Kenya’s body politic. However, the historical in-
justice against peasants in Central Kenya, and the pastoralists in the Rift 
Valley have invariably shaped Kenya’s political history and continue to 
shape Kenya’s political trajectory.
Arguably, Kanyinga’s political economy approach,13 unlike Onoma’s 
property rights and rational choice option or Kamungi’s that emphasizes 
the manifest humanitarian crisis, offer a better approach to understanding 
the politics in the Rift Valley. Rather than a narrow focus on leaders’ eco-
nomic rationality, which is assumed to be consistent and about maximizing 
returns, Kanyinga focuses on the class formation, class struggles, and the 
interplay between class and ethnicity, land and representation, as well as 
the consequences of independent Kenya government policy choices and 
its outcomes. Kanyinga argues that power relations determine the agrarian 
pattern of land tenure, relations and conflicts. Consequently to understand 
the nature of a power structure is to understand the agrarian conflicts with-
in a state.
Rational Choices and Property Rights Approach
Through a comparative study of Ghana, Kenya and Botswana Ato Kwane-
ma Onoma argues that an understanding of the nature of a country’s polit-
ical economy is important, if one is to understand the politics of property 
and property rights in Africa. Onoma posses the question: “why do political 
13 Kanyinga, 2009.
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leaders in Africa create and strengthen institutions of land management 
that secure property rights, while others destroy the already existing insti-
tution?” Using rational-choice reading of what determines a government’s 
choice of property regime, Onoma primarily focuses how attitudes of lead-
ers towards property and competing authorities variously define proper-
ty rights, transparency of transactions on land and security of tenure and 
transparency.
Onoma argues that the type of property (land) regime and security 
of property a country enjoys is determined by the type of benefit a regime 
derives from land. That is a regime can draw either direct or indirect ma-
terial benefit from land. Onoma suggests that politicians or political lead-
ers who derive benefits from land indirectly, through putting land to pro-
ductive use (from agriculture, mining and forestry), like Mancur Olsen’s 
stationary bandits, prefers secure, transparent and reliable system of land 
management, on the one hand. On the other, political leaders who derive 
direct benefit from land, uses land for patronage-client relations and polit-
ical exchanges, like Olsen’s roving bandits, prefer an opaque, insecure and 
unpredictable land management regime.
Moreover, Onoma, through Foucault, focuses on what the competing 
interests of the ruling elites, who direct benefits from land produce: bu-
reaucrats and land brokers produce, the conflicts and parallel registers of 
property, and political patronage. Onoma argues that the confusion created 
by chaotic management of land or property, encourages such governments 
to behave as roving bandits. Onoma argues that Kenyan political regimes 
typifies both the stationary and the roving bandit approach to managing 
land, unlike Botswana which typifies the stationary bandit or Ghana which 
typifies the roving bandit approach.
According to Onoma, early and the late Kenya, managed land dif-
ferently. That is, the Kenyatta regime and the early Moi era managed land 
like stationary bandits. However, the late Moi era managed land like roving 
bandit. The introduction of multiparty politics accounts for Kenya’s shift 
from stationary bandit approach to the roving bandit approach to land 
management. The security of the regime determined how the system of 
property management.
Despite the significance of Onoma’s contribution to one’s understand-
ing of the impact of competition for state power on a country’s political 
economy, political stability and land conflicts, Onoma’s property-centric 
understanding of political economy elides the salience of the particularity 
of struggles for state power, the interplay between class and ethnicity in 
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these struggles, in a former European settler colony such as Kenya.
Onoma’s comparative study of Ghana, Botswana and Kenya, elides 
the historical specificity of Kenya’s politics of rights, civil political and pri-
vate property, as the politics of a one time European settler colony. The 
political contestations in Kenya, though plays out as a struggle over land, 
has never been solely a struggle for land, but at once a struggle for land 
and representation. That is, a struggle for a form of government that would 
guarantee political representation and voice, especially against ethnic 
domination and on issues of land ownership, control and use.
It the politics of the contradictions of the legacy of Mahmood Mam-
dani’s bifurcated colonial state,14 the contestations between subjectivities 
produced by customary sphere and the civil sphere, once civil and politi-
cal rights has been extended to all the previously excluded African ethnic 
groups, and restrictions on movement and residency by “alien-Natives,” 
across the boundaries of the native reserves and the White Highlands, is 
removed.
Ogot observes that, in Kenya, local or the African Native Reserves 
or districts, the only spheres where the British allowed African politics, 
engendered an ethnic consciousness and ways of organizing politics that 
preceded the national consciousness and political organizations.15 Moreo-
ver, no national coalition of notable ethnic elites, from Kenya African Un-
ion to the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) leaders has been sufficiently 
national or held out long enough to transcend its own ethno-regional cleav-
ages. Conversely, the collapse of these coalitions has often led to ethniciza-
tion of political differences.
Consequently, how does political conflicts that pits liberal democrat-
ic citizenship against communitarian citizenship redefine civil political 
rights as well as property rights and its management regime? How does the 
unresolved tension between the politics that invokes the collective rights 
based on ‘reserves or homelands,’ as the abode of particular ‘natives,’ or 
ethnic groups, a politics which demands a federal system of government 
and seeks protection in circumscribing the reach of a unitary state and 
remit over land, on the one hand, and the politics of a unitary state, as the 
abode of atomic, civil and political rights bearing individuals, whose rights 
to property and representation can only be circumscribed by the limits of 
individual abilities, define property rights and politics in the Rift Valley?
14 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. 
Kampala: Fountain Publisher, 1996.
15 B.A. Ogot, History as Destiny and History as Knowledge: Being Reflections on the Problem of 
Historicity and Historiography. Kisumu: Anyange Press, 2005:440-482.
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Onoma’s discusses Kenya in terms of early Kenya and late Kenya, a 
periodization that largely coincides with the Kenyatta regime and the Moi 
regime, respectively. However, the suggestion that what distinguished the 
type of property regime, beside the security of the regime, was the ration-
al logic of the types of benefits, either Kenyatta or Moi, derived from land 
is an academic argument that recalls Kenya “street or bar room talk” with 
an tinge of agrarian prejudice and indifference to pastoralist mode of pro-
duction.
This “street or bar room talk” compares Kenyatta’s regime with Moi’s 
regime. It holds that there was a qualitative difference between the Ken-
yatta (the mostly Kikuyu dominated) regime, a regime of farmers, who 
uses land judiciously tends well to his crops and lives off its produce, while 
Moi’s was a regime of pastoralist, who uses land extravagantly, overstocks 
and razes pasture to the ground and moves on the next one, leaving de-
struction in its wake. Kenyatta was the stationary bandit, while Moi was 
the roving bandit.
These talks ignore the impact of substantive land alienation for sed-
entary agriculture and game reserves, how it hemmed in the pastoralist 
mode of production, turning cattle keeping into a modern tragedy. How-
ever, Onoma’s contentions raises important questions for the politics in 
the Rift Valley: to what extend did the size of the available resources for, 
including land, for regime consolidation and patronage, define the differ-
ences between the Kenyatta and the Moi regime? What was the nature of 
the political threats that the Kenyatta regime faced and the threats the Moi 
regime faced tell us about the politics of property rights? How did these re-
gime insecurities play out in the Rift Valley? What was the impact of Moi’s 
own “counterinsurgency” strategy against the human rights and democra-
cy movements on the outcomes of the British-Kenyatta counterinsurgency 
against the militant Mau Mau and radical nationalist?
Onoma’s dichotomy between direct or indirect material benefit as 
the explanation of political choices of different regimes ignores the fact 
that both Moi and Kenyatta, used land according to the two logics: directly 
and indirectly. The two logics are not mutually exclusive. Successive inde-
pendent era regimes in Kenya have used land to lay the foundation of an 
African bourgeoisie class and to co-opt political opponents, military lead-
ers and supporters. The have also used either public land or land previous-
ly owned by settler farmers for patronage politics. However, Jomo Kenyatta 
had the more settler lands and favorable international regime of aid than 
Moi, for his patronage politics.
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Consequently, what was at stake, arguably, was not the regime of 
property rights per se, but whose property rights was secured by the two 
regimes, in face of political threats. The security of large lands or planta-
tions, owned by the multi-ethnic Kenyan elites and Multi-National Compa-
nies have largely remained secure and have been secured by the both the 
Kenyatta and the Moi government. Conversely, the degrees of insecurity 
may differ, but public land, the pastoralist land, under group ranch or trust 
land titles, have been most insecure property in during these two regimes.
 In the Kenyan context, arguably, the nature of property rights and 
land management system, Onoma’s concern, cannot be understood with-
out examining the major political question: the legacy of the British Ken-
yatta government’s counterinsurgent, adopted by the Kenyatta regime 
against the threats of of the Mau Mau militants demand for land and the 
radical nationalist. Moreover, one cannot ignore the ingrained colonial and 
independent Kenya’s policy bias, which privileges sedentary agricultural 
communities claims to land and productivity sedentary agriculture as op-
posed to nomadic pastoralism, has often undermined the pastoralist com-
munities claims for restorative justice over land.
Human Rights Discourses
The early international human rights report such as Human Rights Watch 
“Divide and Rule” on the political violence in the Rift Valley suggested that 
Kenya’s land questions were: the question of the British white settlers who 
still occupied the land; the question of the pastoralist who originally oust-
ed from the land; and the question of the squatter, farm workers who had 
been drawn into the settler agricultural economy. The report also notes 
that the post-colonial government addressed the interest of the British set-
tlers, however, the post-colonial government made no effort to settle the 
interest of the pastoral communities who had been displaced by the simul-
taneous creation of the White Highlands and the Native Reserves.
However, the report’s framing of Kenya’s land questions ignores an im-
portant land question: the question of the resettlement of some of those ren-
dered landless by colonialism and class struggles in Central Kenya and how 
it has shaped Kenya’s political trajectory. It similarly ignores the class and 
gender dimensions of the land question. The colonial land and labor policy 
not only linked the two land questions and resistance against colonialism, 
but also the major options contemplated by the Central Kenya leaders.
Arguably, whether the militant Mau Mau won or lost the struggle for 
land in Central Kenya, the Central Province land crisis would still have had 
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an impact on the Rift Valley Province’s land question. John Lonsdale notes 
that the question of who, amongst, the mostly Kikuyu militants should be 
allocated the Rift Valley land was one of the issues that divided this mili-
tant nationalist movement.16 The across section of the Mau Mau militants 
argued that the land in the Rift Valley “must go to the tiller: the squatter 
who had cultivated the ‘white lands and formed the major riigi ranks.”17 
However, as Branch details, the moderates, “home guards or the loyalist” 
under Jomo Kenyatta won the struggle. How did the Kenyatta’s govern-
ment respond to the social and political crisis occasioned by colonialism 
and Mau Mau war as a civil war within the Mount Kenya communities, 
especially among the Kikuyu?
The Maasai Land Question
The Africa Watch report’s discussion of the Maasai and the land conflict 
not only reiterates the sedentary agrarian claims, which have been used to 
delegitimize the past and present pastoralist communities’ land claims, but 
also ignores how the colonial and independent Kenya policy contestations 
and contexts that de-legitimizes past and present pastoralists communities 
land claims. The Africa Watch Report notes:
Among the Kikuyu, unlike the communal pastoral groups such as the Maa-
sai and the Kalenjin, farming was an established practice. Accordingly, 
many Kikuyu were eager to take advantage of the opportunity to purchase 
land.18
However, that the fact that former “squatters,” farm workers and oth-
er ethnic groups held more land in the Rift Valley cannot be explained by 
group or communal attitudes towards farming or mastery of farming skills 
only, as the Africa Watch report does. This argument not only undermines 
the reports critical observation that the pastoral land question was not ad-
dressed, but also blames the victim for their loss. It suggests that Africa 
Watch Report does not take the pastoralist loss of land and case for restor-
ative justice seriously.
The report does not take the subjectivities of yester-years victimhood 
and its connection to present suffering seriously. Indeed, a pastoral mode 
of production, which co-exists with sedentary agriculture, hardly needed 
to cultivate its own farming skills. Consequently, the Maasai’s loss cannot 
16 John Lonsdale, “Moral and Political Argument in Kenya,” in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh 
and Will Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa. London: James Currey, 73.
17 ibid, 87.
18 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 24.
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be blamed on the sets of skills they hardly they needed. Rather, the Maasai 
loss can be understood as political loss to mightier political forces. That is, 
the kind of policy and discourses of government and human rights that 
describes the Rift Valley as Kenya’s “most fertile area,” for sedentary agri-
culture.
Arguably, the skew in land allocation in the settlement schemes in the 
Rift Valley largely at the expense of the pastoralist communities was the re-
sult of several factors: It reflects the political as well as the social capital that 
each community had at the turn of independence. It also reflects who was 
favored by the policies of the Kenyatta regime on agriculture, the alloca-
tion of loans for resettlement, the formation of land buying companies and 
co-operatives, and who had the control of national and local land offices.
European Settlers and the 
White High Lands of the Rift Valley
The Rift Valley province or present day counties, as a consequence of the 
colonial settler agriculture’s land and labor policy, have had one of the 
most ethnically diverse rural populations in Kenya. The Anglo-Maasai 
agreements and the 1902 Crown Land Ordinance that decried that “any 
land which was unoccupied, whether temporarily or otherwise by African, 
was available to the European settlers without reference to the Africans.”19
Through this and others decrees, the British colonialist alienated 
land that runs from Nairobi to Mount Elgon, especially in places such as 
Naivasha, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Nakuru, Kericho, Nandi, Uasin Ngishu, 
Trans-Nzoia and Bungoma, where most of the political violence has been 
experienced. They also created several native reserves for the pastoralist 
along these locations, notably for the Maasai and the Kalenjin and game 
reserves out of parts of the Native Reserves.20
Therefore, the British settlers to alienated more land from the pasto-
ralist communities whose land use pattern, for pastoral mode of produc-
tion, was often defined by temporary absence from locations that spanned 
large swathe of land, but construed as “unoccupied” wasteful by the Brit-
ish. In absolute terms, despite their spirited resistance, the pastoralist com-
munities, especially the resistance by the Nandi of the Rift Valley, lost the 
largest acres of land to the British settler economy, more than other ethnic 
groups.21
19 Government of Kenya, 2002: 61.
20 Ibid.
21 Caroline Elkins’ Britain Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya. Capetown: Jonathan Cape, 
2005, grudgingly concedes this fact in footnote number 26.
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While the British European settler economy alienated from the pas-
toralists, it drew its labor from other Native Reserves. The pastoralists were 
considered ill adapted to sedentary agrarian labor. Consequently, as Lynch 
points out “the White High Lands” drew its labor from other Native Re-
serves, notably, from the Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, Teso, and Luhya native re-
serves. These policies not only altered the demographic make up of the 
White High Lands, but also of the politics of who would have the right to 
land and to represent the residents of such locations, after independence.22
Land and Political Violence
If, as B.A. Ogot argues, Mau Mau war was at once “a militant nationalism 
and a peasant war emerging out of the growing class struggles” within the 
Gikuyu community,23 then, the Africa Watch argument ignores the signifi-
cance of the Rift Valley to the process of class formation and capital accu-
mulation by the Kenyatta regime elite. It ignores the connections between 
yester-years injustices and the humanitarian and manifest injustices it ad-
vocates should be redressed.
The land question in Central Kenya was settled in favor of the home 
guards, multi-ethnic independent era Kenya elites, remaining British set-
tlers and the Multi-National Corporations, and largely at the expense of the 
Mau Mau of Central Kenya and the pastoralist in the Rift Valley. The “avail-
ability” of Rift Valley land, however, greatly facilitated the consolidation of 
the political and economic positions of the home guards in Central Kenya 
and stabilization of the Kenyatta regime: it enabled them to export the so-
cial and political crisis, wrought by colonial dispossession, to the Rift Valley.
However, its success also rested on ability of both the Kenyatta and 
the Moi regime’s the suppression of the pastoralist claims championed by 
leaders such as Jean-Marie Seroney among the Nandi, and the William 
Ntimama, among the Maasai.24 These demands had been voluble during 
the Lancaster House Constitutional talks.
22 Lynch, 2011.
23 B. A. Ogot, “Mau Mau and Nationhood—the untold story,” in History as Destiny and History as 
Knowledge: Being Reflections on the Problems of Historicity and Historiography. Kisumu: Anyange 
Press, 2005, p.336.
24 In the early 1980s, President Moi detained William ole Ntimama over the Maasai land 
claims. While the Kalenjin elite closed ranks with the Maasai elite in the 1990, there was a 
tension over land claims between the two groups. The Maasai claimed Uasin Gishu, protested 
the resettlement of the Kipsigis in parts of Narok, and the Mau forest region.
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The Lancaster House Talks and the Maasai Agreement
Ogot points out that the Maasai, for example, had lost huge swathes of land 
under the Anglo-Maasai treaties of 1904 and 1911, and more land, when 
three game reserves Mara, Amboseli and Samburu, were created out of 
the Maasai Native Land.25 However, the colonial government and the suc-
cessive post -colonial government have remained indifferent to the Maas-
ai land claims. During the Lancaster Constitutional talks the Maasai land 
claims were dismissed, to the chagrin of Justus Ole Tipis, the leader of the 
Maasai members of the legislative council and Maasai delegation to the 
Lancaster talks.
Justus ole Tipis argued for restorative justice, he proposed that each 
land case should be addressed discretely and only by the signatories to the 
agreement that supposedly transferred the land to the British. The Maasai 
delegation had raised the following issues, amongst others, that:
(2) All along the African political cry has been that Africans in Kenya, by 
their tribes, should get their lands back
(4) The bulk of the Kenya Highlands fall within the original Masai territory 
which fact the agreement admits and recognizes.
(5) In the process of re-acquiring land to hand back to African tribes—for 
this is in effect what resettlement comes to—the Masai claims and rights 
must be fully recognized and their lands must not be used as pawn in the 
game of political appeasement of non-Masai.
The Maasai delegation also raised an interesting legal argument on the 
controversial 1904 and 1911 Anglo-Masai agreements, that is:
(6) The Masai cannot accept that a special guarantee under the agreement 
should be a subject to be provided for in any special manner under the 
independent constitution of Kenya. Whereas Her Majesty’s Government 
was a foreign government the future Kenya government, of which the Ma-
sai are one; and just as the Masai will not be in a position to appeal to Her 
Majesty’s Government if the new Kenya government discriminates against 
them as a tribe, it is idle to pretend that the Masai should transfer the faith 
and trust which they had in Her Majesty’s Government to a new Kenya 
government to safeguard their tribal right in any other manner that does 
not apply to all other tribes alike.26
(7) To this effect, Sir, it should be noted that no monetary return was paid 
25 B.A. Ogot, “Political history of post-colonial Kenya,” in History as Destiny and History as 
Knowledge: Being Reflections on the Problems of Historicity and Historiography. Kisumu: Anyange 
Press, 2005: 461.
26 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
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to the Masai for land, and what we are asking is the return of our land from 
those who took it from us.
In the fair copy of the report on the conference, the Maasai delegation had 
made the following proposals amongst others:
(i) the land which the Masai vacated in accordance with the Agreement 
belong to the Masai. The Masai wanted their ownership to be recognized 
and have the first claim on these lands when they were vacated by the Eu-
ropeans who now farmed them;
(iv) they asked that some means should be found whereby the tribes akin 
to them now occupying land to the north and west of the Rift Valley should 
be enabled to unite.27
On the contrary, the British argued that:
Her majesty’s Government could not admit any claims in respect of lands 
which the Masai claim had vacated under the Agreements. The Masai had 
agreed to give up the occupation of certain lands; in return they had re-
ceived a guarantee of quiet enjoyment in respect to the lands reserved to 
them, and this would continue to be guaranteed under the constitution. 
There was nothing in the Agreement to suggest that Masai retained a right 
to re-occupy their former land if Europeans vacated it, nor could such a 
suggestion be founded on any legal principle to this case.28
However, the rough notes, archived as part of this report, gives a glimpse 
into the underlying attitudes of the British colonial government toward the 
Maasai that explains their reluctance to entertain the Maasi’s demand for 
restorative justice. The notes points out that, to the British colonial officials:
The Masai tribe hold some 16,000 square miles of land in Kenya by treaty 
with the British government. The Masai who today number some 75,000 
have in the past, because of their war-like activities, occupied the most fer-
tile grazing lands in Kenya by keeping out other tribes by force. After the 
advent of the European, the Masai were removed from most of the fertile 
lands held by them and this land was given over for European settlement. 
The Masai are now claiming all their former lands as and when they are 
taken over by an African Government from the European farmer. The Con-
ference decided that the Masai treaties of 1904 and 1911 are no longer valid 
largely because of the extent of the present Masai reserve (16,000 square 
miles) is more than enough for the needs of the Masai and for the foresee-
27 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
28 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
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able future.29
The Maasai delegation saw the refusal of the British to acknowledge their 
land claims as betrayal but remained resolute in their quest for restorative 
justice. Justus ole Tipis concluded:
In conclusion, Sir, since the so-called British justice has been betrayed, has 
diminished, in the way the Masai case has been handled, in that this is a 
case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, the land-hungry and the land profiteers 
and those who took our land from us, when the British Government with-
draw, we register our dissatisfaction in no uncertain terms to Her Majesty’s 
Government, who are parties to this agreement—that there is no settlement, 
that the Masai on their part must have their land back to benefit by it, that 
Her Majesty’s Government have responsibility which should not be lightly 
discharged, and that those who take it that they are going to benefit at the 
expense of the Masai should duly take heed. No man on earth could dream 
and expect the Masai as a people to be on the dry, arid lands on to which 
they were pushed, whereas our former rich and very fertile lands is given 
to people who had no claim to it whatsoever.30
If the rough notes revealed the British government’s prejudice against the 
Maasai in particular and pastoralism in general, then the KANU delegates 
the Lancaster Conference expressed a similar view, albeit with the echoes 
of British colonial rationale for dispossession Africans of their lands. In an 
antecedence to the policy choice offered by Kenya’s seminal development 
policy, African Socialism and its Application to Development: the Sessional Paper 
no.10 of 1965, the KANU delegation noted that:
Land is a national asset and its full development is urgently necessary in 
the interests of all the people of Kenya, and indeed of the future East Africa 
Federation. The wealth of the country is dependent to such a great extent 
on its agriculture that no racial or tribal considerations should be permitted 
to interfere with the attainment of its maximal potential. It is recognized 
that land is an emotional issue in Kenya; that many grievances, real or im-
aginary, exist; and that some areas wish to guard most jealously against cen-
tral government control. Whatever measure may be necessary to allay such 
fears, it must be clearly established that the Government’s principle aim 
must be to ensure maximum productivity for the benefit of all. Mr. Jomo 
Kenyatta has consistently reiterated his broad policy as regards land. It is 
that the maximum security must be given to those irrespective of race or 
tribe, who have developed their land and that idle underdeveloped acres 
29 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
30 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
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must be made available for the benefit of the landless and the impover-
ished. This memorandum is directed towards the detailed attainment of 
this policy.31
In the Sessional Paper no 10 of 1965,32 president Jomo Kenyatta, hoped the 
publication of the policy document “should bring an end to all the con-
flicting, theoretical and academic arguments that have been going on.” 
Kenyatta noted that Kenya could not develop, if Kenyans “continue with 
debates on theories and doubts about the aim our society.” Therefore the 
government would pursue growth and productivity. The policy noted that 
“idle land and mismanaged farms will not be permitted whether such is owned by 
Kenya citizen or foreigner.”33
The policy recommended that land should be put to productive use, 
effectively and closely controlled so that its ownership is not concentrated 
in the hand of a few. More importantly, land would be progressively Afri-
canized, ceiling on placed on ownership and the formation of co-operative 
would be promoted to ensure equitable distribution of land. On the former 
European settler farms, the policy said: “it should be established that property 
in future should be given to producer co-operative formed by people such workers 
and squatters already employed on the land”34 and a credit facility extended 
to such co-operatives to achieve this goal. On the contrary, Kamungi notes 
that Oginga Odinga, the leader of the radical nationalist who favored na-
tionalization of these land, had proposed that land be allocated on 60:40 
ratio, 60 for the “indigenes” and 40 for the “outsiders”.35 What did the pol-
icy produce?
“Robbing Peter to pay Paul”
Ogot in an evocative and incendiary article on Kenya’s post-colonial histo-
ry argues that:
Kenyatta appeased the land hunger of the former Mau Mau by successive-
ly settling them into the Million-Acre, Haraka and Harambee Settlement 
Schemes on soft loans terms. Between 1960 and 1966, the Kikuyu came 
back to the Rift Valley, and the Gikuyu reserves of Kiambu, Muranga and 
Nyeri were now extended into Nakuru, Laikipia and Nyandarua districts—
31 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference Lancaster House, 6/2/1962 
to 13/3/1962.
32 Government of Kenya, African Socialism and its Application to Development: the Sessional Paper no. 
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which became fully Kikuyu reserves—and also into Eastern Nandi, Eastern 
Kericho, and the Southern—Uasin-Gishu districts. Also, tracks of land in the 
Rift Valley were given to the President’s closest sycophants such as Njenga 
Karume and Kihika Kimani. In this process, the concept of communal land 
ownership that was so dear to the framers of Majimboism was jettisoned 
and nobody listened to the cries of the historically aggrieved communities 
such as the Maasai and the Kalenjin about their “lost land.36
Kanyinga also notes that the need to contain the social crises, which under-
pinned the Mau Mau war of independence, led to an initial Africanization 
process that favored the Kikuyu peasants and annexation of parts of the 
Rift Valley, such as Kinangop, to Central Province to settle landless Kikuy-
us. The subsequent resettlement schemes favored laborers, also skewed 
the redistribution in favor of the Kikuyu, who constituted the majority of 
laborers in the settler farms37. This undercut the social base of both Mau 
Mau militant and radical nationalist, however, it ethnicized the land ques-
tion in the Rift Valley. It also evoked ethnic animosity as expressed by Jean 
Seroney’s “Nandi Hills Declaration” of 1969.38
Brown notes that at the Coast, the re-settlement in ‘schemes’ such 
as Mpeketoni was done in favor of the Luo, Kikuyu, Kisii and the Kamba. 
These communities are politically referred to as “wabara” or people from 
the hinterland as opposed to “wapuani” or the Coastal people.39 Wapuani’s 
landless lost out in these settlement schemes, despite having a long history 
of being dispossession that ran far back to the establishment of Arab plan-
tations such as the contested Mazrui family owned lands. They lost more 
land in Kwale, Kilifi, Malindi, and Taita Taveta to settlement schemes such 
as Mpeketoni and Lake Kenyatta, settlement schemes, and the beach plots 
to the Kenyatta elite.
The pastoralists land claims and hard feelings laid latent, under the 
authoritarian one-party state, until Moi stroked the smoldering embers of 
1960s Majimbo fires in 1990s to stave off the opposition of an emerging 
multi-ethnic political coalition agitating for political change. Arguably, this 
is the politics that contextualizes William ole Ntimama’s callous remarks, 
cited in the Africa Watch Report, in response to accusation of instigating 
36 B.A. Ogot, “Political history of post-colonial Kenya,” in History as Destiny and History as 
Knowledge: Being Reflections on the Problems of Historicity and Historiography. Kisumu: Anyange 
Press, 2005, p.461.
37 Kanyinga, 2009: 328-332
38 Lynch, 2011: 98.
39 Stephen Brown, “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring “Ethnic Clashes” in Kenya,” in Chandra 
Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacity 
for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
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the killings in Enosopukia.
The report notes that Ntimama said that “he had no regrets about 
the events in Enosopukia because the Maasai were fighting for their rights. 
He also said that the Kikuyu ‘had suppressed the Maasai, taken their land 
and degraded their environment…we have to say enough is enough. I had 
to lead the Maasai in protecting our rights.40Indeed, the connections be-
tween the violence and the unfinished politics of federalism (Majimbo) 
were widely articulated by various politicians and public intellectuals in 
the 1990s.
David Ndii, in a critique of the emerging national consensus on the 
way of to end Kenya’s economic and political crisis of the Moi era, not-
ed that Kenya is a nation of tribes.41 Yet the ascendant discourses of hu-
man rights, constitutional reform, rule of law and economic development, 
seems not to have factored in this important fact. Ndii observed that Kenya 
“like Ethiopia, Tanzania and every other African country, are a nation of 
tribes and there seems to be little point in chasing a nation of make-be-
lieve, something different from the sum of its tribes.”42
According to Ndii, ethnic identities were legitimate political identi-
ties, yet the current constitution and constitutional debates seem not ac-
knowledge this political fact and address is as such. According to Ndii, the 
emerging national consensus on how to reform Kenya’s politics and eco-
nomics was not addressing an important issue: the question of land and 
ethnicity. Kenya’s transition to democracy must confront the issue of eth-
nicity and land, perhaps in the manner in which Ethiopia, and Tanzania 
had variously addressed these issues. The critical issue was: are tribes legit-
imate identities in constitutional order?”43
Moreover, in making a case for a serious consideration of the question 
of ethnicity and federalism, Ndii pointed out that:
It is foolhardy to hold the view, like one often hears among the well-heeled 
Kikuyus, that the community owes their geographical spread in the country 
entirely to their entrepreneurial prowess.
It is matter of historical fact that the co-optation of Kadu into Kanu after in-
dependence gave the Kenyatta government the latitude to pursue, not only 
a land policy that benefitted Kikuyus and other favoured groups, but also to 
deploy the provincial administration to entrench and protect the interests 
40 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 59.
41 David Ndii, “Law reforms must address land issue,” Sunday Nation 23 July 1995, p.7
42 David Ndii, “Law reforms”
43 David Ndii, “Law reforms”
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of the favoured groups everywhere in the country.44
Ndii also suggested that Kenya’s political crisis was not only underpinned 
by the Kenyatta regimes use of the provincial administrative structures to 
entrench and protect elite and favored groups’ interests, but also by the 
application of the lessons of the counterinsurgency land reforms of the 
1950s. Ndii noted:
More importantly, the land reform process initiated under the Swynnerton 
Plan in the 1950s was already rigged in that direction. The architects of the 
plan made it plain that they considered the creation of a “landed” capitalist 
class among the peasantry as the solution to political dissent and economic 
viability of the colony. But it does not matter whether this is the true inter-
pretation of history or not. It only matters that is perceived as such.
Hence the perception that the current constitutional order, in so far as 
land rights are concerned, carries historical injustice. This perception 
is not inconsequential.45
Although making a case for the constitutional recognition of ethnicity and 
federalism as means of protecting ethnic land rights, Ndii also observed 
that there was either a perception or fact that “the presidency and not the 
constitution… is the ultimate safeguard of tribal interests and the seeming-
ly irrational unwillingness of any tribe to compromise on the occupancy of 
State House.”46
Consequently, Ndii suggested that Kenya’s land reforms should con-
sider Tanzania’s land reform suggestions: abolition of centralized land reg-
istration, the institution of local registries and land controlled by elected 
local land committees, and that the radical land title be vested in national 
commission, and not the president.
Echoes of Lancaster House Constitutional Talks
Ndii proposals on the recognition of ethnic identities, corresponding eth-
nic land rights recalled the KANU-KADU debates at the Lancaster House 
Constitutional Conference, a political divide not just by ethnicities as is 
often stated, but also by social-economic inequalities between the commu-
nities they represented. That is, the centralist and the Majimboist/ federal 
debates on state power, the structure of government and land. KADU had 
argued for a system of regional government with powers over land, region-
al police force, and a bi-cameral system of parliament, where the senate 
44 David Ndii, “Law reforms”
45 David Ndii, “Law reforms”
46 David Ndii, “Law reforms”
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and a high threshold on legislative reform would protect the regional inter-
ests.47 KANU opposed these propositions.
However, KANU tactically conceded, and Kenya briefly was a federal 
state. KANU did not want to the difficult issues of land, ethnic identity and 
regionalism to delay independence. KANU’s strategy was to use democratic 
procedures and the co-optation of the KADU elite to undo these constitu-
tional guarantees. KANU’s understanding of democracy as majoritarianism 
is instructive in this regard. At the Lancaster House conference Jomo Ken-
yatta, the president of Kanu had argued:
First, KANU has set itself firmly on the path of Parliamentary Democracy 
fully understanding and accepting its implications. That is what we mean 
when we say we want the British or Westminster pattern of Constitution. 
That is why we demand a clear and comprehensive Bill of Rights and an 
independent judiciary. I would like to make it very clear Sir, that my party 
and I are definitely against any form of dictatorship and we are, and have 
always been, ready to consider reasonable proposals to ensure that dictator-
ship does not emerge. We believe that our proposal contain the necessary 
safeguards for this purpose. But it must be made equally clear that Parlia-
mentary Government means effective Government. It means Government 
by the majority party and the consent of the minority to the predominance 
of the majority party, its leadership and its policy until the next election. 
That is what my friend Mr. Odinga termed dictation by consent, and he 
cited the British Government as a good example of this. Today the Conserv-
atives Party rules, sometimes very strongly, but this system if very different 
to dictatorship.48
In other words, KANU, the dominant pre-independence national po-
litical coalition, thought of democracy as the right of the majority to impose 
their will on the minority, willy-nilly, not as system of government that rec-
ognizes the fears, rights and opinion of the minorities as legitimate, and 
one that required various institutional and electoral safeguards. To KANU, 
what was good for the British, however brutish, was good for Kenya. KANU 
ensured that the Majimbo Constitution died on the vine: the first amend-
ments to the Lancaster House Constitution made Kenya a republic with an 
executive president, with immense unchecked or balanced powers over 
the judiciary, the parliament, the police and the parliament. These amend-
ments notably abolished the revenue base of the Majimbo government and 
47 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Kenya constitutional conference, memorandum by the KADU 
Parliamentary Group, 20 February 1962.
48 KNA, MAC/KEN/47, Kenya constitutional conference, statement by Jomo Kenyatta, president of 
KANU, 21 February 1962.
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strangled them out of existence.
The Independent Kenya’s Settlement Schemes
The European settler state’s mode of rule and white settler economy pro-
duced two political subjects whose claims to land is mutually exclusive: the 
pastoralist communities who were displaced from the land to make room 
for most of the settler farms in the “White Highlands” claimed the land on 
the basis of ancestry and pre-colonial occupation. They argued that “White 
HighLands” should be re-allocated on the basis of the claims of ancestry 
and restorative justice. However, the ethnic groups, who had been labored 
in the settler farms or share-cropped with the settler farms argued that “the 
White Highlands” should be allocated on the basis of residency and labor 
that had turned these lands into profitable sedentary agricultural lands.
During the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, the pastoral-
ist communities’ leaders, mostly in Kenya Democratic African Union and 
allied to various settler political parties, unsuccessfully pursued the right 
to former White High Lands as a quest for restorative justice. However, the 
failure of KADU’s quest for restorative justice was compounded by the Jomo 
Kenyatta’s government political strategy and policy choices, which were a 
continuation of counter-insurgency strategy of the British against the Mau 
Mau and radical Kenyan nationalist, who were demanding redistribution 
of White Highlands without compensation.
Karuti Kanyinga notes points out that early settlement schemes, 
mostly the mono-ethnic types, were skewed in favor of the landless Ki-
kuyus, considered the most restless landless people, whose demand for 
land could destabilize the independent Kenyan polity. For example, the 
Kinagop settlement scheme in Nyandarua district was curved out of land, 
which the Kalenjin and the Maasai claimed, but was used to resettle the 
landless Kikuyus from the highlands and the populated native reserves.49
Kanyinga adds Jomo Kenyatta’s Africanisation of the White High-
lands ethnicized the land question. The independent era resettlement 
policy favored the labor-residence claims and willing-buyer purchase, but 
repressed the pastoralist communities’ indigeneity and historical injustice 
claims and the quest for restorative justice over lost lands. The pastoralist 
were the most disadvantaged by these policies, however, the Kikuyu, by 
the virtue of a long history of collective solidarity, colonial and Kenyatta 
government’s counter-insurgency strategy, knowledge of the intricacies of 
49 Kanyinga, 2009: 332.
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modern land management system and titling,50 Kikuyu elite control of key 
government offices and banks were the most advantaged in the market 
mediated competition for land.
The Akiwumi report notes that the Kenyatta’s government effected 
resettlement process in three ways: government bought land and “trans-
ferred to Africans in either high density schemes, in which plots were small 
or low density schemes where larger plots were available,” government 
also set up a parastatal the Agricultural Development Co-operation (ADC), 
which bought and managed, singly or jointly with private companies, some 
of the settler farms in the former White High Lands or Scheduled Areas, 
and lastly, individuals, through co-operative societies or land buying com-
panies, bought large lands, with single block title, borrowing loans from 
the Land Banks, Agricultural Finance Corporation and other sources.51
The ADC or sometimes the Ministry of Agriculture directly took over 
the management of some of the former settler farms, and eventually sold 
these lands to land companies or co-operative societies owned by the farm 
hands, who had been “squatting” on these lands and subsequently sub-
divided into small individual owned parcels. The land co-operatives or 
companies’ shareholders were ethnically diverse. However, while some 
peasants got title deed for their pieces of land, others, based on ethnic dis-
crimination by the Moi government, were not given title deeds.
However, as Paul Syagga points out, the multi-ethnic Kenyan elites 
were allocated “the Z plots,” a 100-acre land, together with the farmhouse, 
following a 1964 Jomo Kenyatta directive that such lands should be allo-
cated to prominent people,52 who, unlike the smallholder peasants, could 
preserve its beauty and grandeur. But more importantly, used to co-opt the 
elite and prop an African bourgeoisie with adequate stakes in moderate 
politics and status quo. The list of the beneficiaries of land allocated on 
this basis reads like who was who in Kenya, with the notable exceptions 
such as Joseph Murumbi, the second vice president, and Bildad Kaggia, an 
assistant minister.
The government officials’ manipulation of bureaucratic processes 
of land titling and differential access to state power and loans from land 
banks as well as distress sales exacerbated the land inequality between 
50 Kanyinga, 2009: 328, notes the transformation of land tenure system for Africans, the 
individualization, surveying, consolidation and registration of individual title began in 
Central Province.
51 Government of Kenya, 2002: 62.
52 Paul syagga, “Public Land, Historical Land Injustice and the new Constitution of Kenya.” 
Working Paper Series no.9. Nairobi: Society for International Development, 2011.
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classes and between ethnic groups in the Rift Valley. However, the land 
conflicts did not take a violent expression until the demand for multi-party 
politics gained ground. These are the farms that have bore the brunt of 
the political violence that defines Kenya’s competition for political office, 
especially the presidency. Indeed, a case study of two such farms Meteitei 
and Buru, the first to experience the violence, is illustrative.
Meteitei Farm
On the 28th of October 1991, violence broke out in Meteitei Farm in Tin-
deret, Nandi District, in the Rift Valley province of Kenya. B.A Ogot notes 
that from 1895 to 1905, the British organized several military attacks against 
the Nandi, killing over 100,000 Nandis including the Orkoyiot, their polit-
ical and spiritual leader.53 The Nandi lost 1250 square miles of land to the 
British White Settler schemes. The 1934 Carter Land Commission noted 
that the Maasai and the Nandi had lost the greatest acreage of land to colo-
nial settler agriculture.54
Although the Kalenjin (Nandi) land grievance against settlements 
schemes, Kenyan elite owned large farms and mostly British owned Mul-
ti-National Companies remains latent, Moi regime stroked the embers of 
fire in the early 1990s.55
The Meteitei, Buru, Owiro and Momoneit farms were located in the 
former white highlands and along the former Kalenjin native reserves. 
In some cases also these settlement schemes were also allocated district 
administrative and ethnic boundaries. However, the contested allocating 
these lands to the laborers or former squatters, mainly from the Kikuyu, 
Luo, Kisii and Luhya ethnic groups, without redressing the Kalenjin land 
claims, the government created tension between ethnic groups and the 
Kalenjin.
Not surprising, the political violence began with the settlement 
schemes most vulnerable to competing political claims and grievance over 
land: who has the rights to own and use land in the former ‘scheduled 
areas’ or white highlands, and what is the basis of land ownership and 
control of land? Market conferred rights to property or historical claims of 
ancestry and belonging.
The KANU politicians exploited these grievances, but politicized only 
the Nandi or the Kipsigis hard feelings against the smallholder peasants 
53 B.A Ogot, 2005: 397.
54 Ibid.
55 Weekly Review, “The Multi-party debate,” 30 March 1990.
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from the ethnic communities perceived to be supporters of, or sympathetic 
to, the opposition pressure group Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
(FORD). The victims of the violence as well as other Kenyans were puzzled 
by the surprise attacks. However, the violence was not confined to only one 
farm.
The violence quickly spread to other neighboring farms such as Ow-
iro, and Buru farms and along the boundaries of Kericho, Nandi and Kisu-
mu districts. On 4th of November 1991 the Daily Nation reported that:
Six more people have died following clashes over land in Tinderet Divi-
sion of Nandi District. Three primary schools have been closed while po-
lice estimate that over 10,000 people were rendered homeless after their 
homes were set on fire by rampaging youth. The clashes, which stated the 
Meteitei Land Buying Company farm in Songhor Location last week, have 
now spread to Koisagat Farm, Kitororo, Kimwani Agricultural Corporation 
(ADC) farm and Owiro Farmers Co-operative Society. …56
The chairman of Owiro Farmers Company, Mariko Muga, told the Daily 
Nation that “nearly 2000 people out of the 3000 (including children) who 
had inhabited the farm had been rendered homeless. He said his company 
owns the 1,600 hectare farm.” Muga also told the Daily Nation “his society 
had bought the Owiro farm from a European in 1968 for 740,000 Kenya 
shillings. He said that there were no land disputes among the members 
of his society. However, those who had raided the farm claimed that the 
members of his company were ‘outsiders.’
Mariko Muga, also told the Daily Nation that:
Raids at his farm started on Friday night and continued most of Saturday 
and Sunday. He said that the attackers ordered those they considered to 
outsiders to leave their homes after which the huts or houses were set on 
fire. He estimated the gang, which attacked on the first night numbered 
300 and 400 people. Mr Muga claimed that prior to the attack, the chief of 
Songhor location, Mr Henry Tuwai, had advised residents against sleeping 
in their house because of the danger of raid by morans. Mr Muga claimed 
that on Saturday, police came and fired in the air but the morans continued 
looting and burning houses.57
Indeed, the Daily Nation reporter “saw several of the raiders armed with 
bows and arrows, patrolling Owiro farm.”58 The Daily Nation further report-
ed that when the leaders (who included the Nandi District Commissioner, 
56 Nation Reporters and Correspondent, “Six more killed in land clashes,” Daily Nation, 4 
November 1991, p.1-2.
57 Nation reporters and correspondents, “six more killed in land clashes”
58 Nation reporters and correspondents, “six more killed in land clashes”
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David Mativo, the Minister for Co-operative Development, John Cheruiyot, 
the Nandi KANU branch chairman, Henry Kosgey and the Rift Valley Pro-
vincial Officer), and contingent of anti-riot police office visited the area, on 
Saturday, these leader saw “ over 200 grass thatched huts being set ablaze 
by over 400 unruly youths.”59
Gerry Oduor,60 a Kenya Times reporter, who covered the same story, 
also noted that:
Hundreds of villagers fleeing land clashes in Tinderet Division, Nandi 
District, yesterday continued to pour in the neighbouring Kisumu District. 
Following the clashes—which spread to Songhor, Koru, Kopere, Kadan, 
Chemelil and Muhoroni—hundreds of security personnel have been de-
ployed as far as from Kericho to restore order on the main highway where 
mobs have erected road block barricades.
Oduor, added that:
Yesterday at least two people were admitted at the New Nyanza General 
Hospital following the land clashes, which erupted over eight days ago at 
Meiteitei, Nandi District. ….the assailants from Nandi District, numbering 
between 200-300 youths dressed in red and white uniforms, on Monday 
afternoon set hundreds of villagers, mainly small scale farmers fleeing for 
their lives as they stormed the ADC farm at Kowiro
One victim of the violence, Martin Ogango, told Oduor that:
 the raiders struck at about 8 pm and shot him with three arrows. “I man-
aged to pluck out the arrows and raised alarm.” The raiders fled after set-
ting my house on fire… the raider also escaped with a few of his belongings, 
including household goods… 61
Flora Mumbi Kaguaru, a resident of Momoniet farm, Kipkelion in Kericho 
district, who experienced the violence, told a Daily Nation correspondent 
“a band of arsonist raided Momoniet farm on Wednesday at 6.00pm and 
burnt homes.”62 The victims of the violence told the Daily Nation corre-
spondence that “the raiders were heading towards Sitoito Farm and the 
Keringet area in Nakuru District.”63
59 Nation reporters and correspondents, “six more killed in land clashes”
60 Gerry Oduor, “More families flee Tinderet clashes,” Kenya Times, 6 November 1991. p.1. In a press 
statement to The East African Standard the Nandi leaders accused the Luo community of 
sparking the violence. The Nandi leaders alleged that the whereas the situation in Meteitei 
farm was tense, violence began when a “Luo policeman shot a Nandi during a riot on 
Meteitei farm on the October 29.” See, Kihu Irimu, “Clashes: Nandis not to blame—Kosgey,” 
The East African Standard, 6 November 1991, p.15.
61 Oduor, “More families,” p2.
62 Nation Correspondents, “46 charged over land clashes,” Daily Nation, 8 November 1991, p9.
63 Nation Correspondents, “46 charged over land clashes,” Daily Nation, 8 November 1991, p. 9.
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Similar patterns of violence would be witnessed in Saboti, Endebes, 
Kwanza in Trans-Nzoia district, from 23 December 1991 to July 1992,64 in 
Mount Elgon region from January 1992 to August 1992, the Nandi-Uasin 
Gishu Kakamega district common border, in Nyamaiya, Nyangusu and Kil-
goris borders of Rift Valley and Nyanza province, January 1992- to- Eronge 
and Sotik, in 1992. Molo, Olenguruone, and Burnt Forest would particular-
ly experience continual attacks in the 1990s.
The attacks in these places followed a similar pattern: a surprise night 
or day time attack the attacks by a group of well organized invaders, who 
mostly targeted non-Kalenjin and non-Maasai ethnic groups living in eth-
nically mixed settlement schemes of the former white highlands. They 
touched houses, maimed and killed, while those in charge of state security 
apparatuses dithered.
Official alibis: 
Tradition, Cattle Rustling, and Border Disputes
Although the patterns of these attacks were similar, the government expla-
nation for the violence was varied. As Brown notes, through this strategy, 
the government successfully represented the conflicts as something local, 
and does not call for international intervention. Yusuf Haji, the highest 
ranked administrator in the Rift Valley province, described the violence 
that hit the settlement schemes as “kitu kichafu sana” ( a very dirty affair).65 
President Moi explained that the violence along the Kisii, Nyamira and 
Kericho District administrative borders, Moi’s was caused by political in-
citement by FORD activist who stroked the “ traditionally cattle-rustling and 
border disputes” between the Kisii and Maasai.”66
Moreover, according to this government explanation, the ethnic com-
munities living in Mt Elgon region, namely the Sabaots, the Tesos and the 
Luyias, “have traditionally been suspicious of one another due to cattle-rus-
64 Sunday Nation Team, “5 more killed in ethnic clashes,” Sunday Nation 29 December 1991: p.1 
and p.11.
65 The Rift Valley Provincial Administrator, Yusuf Haji, described the seven-day attacks in 
Meteitei and Owiro farms as “Kitu chafu sana,” Kiswahili for “ a very dirt affair” as Emman 
Omari and Nation Correspondent reported. See, “Nandi clashes: Govt’s ‘return to home’ 
orders,” Daily Nation, 7 November 1991, p.32. However, Haji’s statement hardly expresses 
moral indignation or disgust. The Nation reports that Haji told the public at Maraba in the 
affected region “the skirmishes illustrates what it means to have chaos.” In Charles Tilley’s 
formulation, what was sordid was the dirty business of valorizing ethnic differences, land 
grievances and reconstructing borders and boundaries in the Rift Valley along the 1962 fault 
lines, by the Daniel Moi’s regime as a bulwark against the threat posed by multiparty politics 
to the regime’s hold on state power.
66 Kenneth Mwema, “how clashes were planned.”
MISR WP 24 Akoko.indd   30 15/10/2015   09:22
‘KITU KICHAFU SANA’: DANIEL ARAP MOI AND THE DIRTY BUSINESS OF DISMEMBERING KENYA’S BODY POLITIC
tling, the dominance of the Bukusu in district affairs, and land problems.” 
The Sabaots feeling marginalized have demanded “ a district of their own.”
However, the Trans-Nzoia seemed to have a difference: the immedi-
ate cause of the violence was Sabaots’ campaign that Mt. Elgon Sub-District 
be transferred to Trans-Nzoia District. Similarly, the government discount-
ed the cattle rustling argument on the Kipsigis, Kisii and Luo conflicts. It 
noted that the violence cause by cattle theft had continued among these 
groups “unabated for decades, without causing serious tribal clashes.” The 
government offered an alternative explanation.
Shareholder Disputes
The government officers at both the national and the local levels said that 
disputes among the residents of Meteitei and Owiro farms, on the Kericho 
Kisumu District borders, explained the violence. The Minister of State in 
the Office of President, Joseph Ngutu, told parliament that “the cause of 
the of the problem was land shares between some local residents. There 
had been claims by the parties in dispute about the genuine and bogus 
members.”67 Indeed, the Nandi District Commissioner blamed the vio-
lence in the Meteitei farm on the unresolved ten-year-old land dispute in 
the 1,934 hectares farm.68
The Nandi District Kalenjin politicians, namely, Henry Kosgey, Ben-
jamin Kositany and Hezekiel Bargetuny accused the Luo leaders, namely, 
the Members of Parliament , Onyango Midika, of Muhoroni and Ojwang 
K’ombudo of Nyakach constituency, respectively, of inciting their constit-
uents against the Kalenjins. However, Ojwang K’ombudo, the Member of 
Parliament for Nyakach noted “Kalenjin leaders must bare the full respon-
sibility over the matter.” K’ombudo noted that the “land dispute and acts 
of hooliganism of on the non -Nandi members in the area is “a direct result 
of the recent campaigns by Kalenjin leaders for the re-introduction of Ma-
jiboism.”
The Kalenjin leaders, however, noted that the matter “was purely a 
land issue that had got out of control and not a political issue at all.”69 But, 
the member of the Owiro cooperative society, the victims of the violence, 
disagreed. They pointed out that some of “their members had started the 
clashes over land. We are considered outsiders and therefore, have to be 
67 Standard correspondent, “Minister disregard of law to blame,” The East African Standard, 7 
November 1991, p4.
68 Emman Omari and Nation Correspondent, “Nandi clashes: Govt’s ‘return home’ orders, 7 
November 1991, p.32.
69 Gerry Oduor, “families fleeing”
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quiet, they said.”70
The Akiwumi report notes that Buru Farm, formerly owned by a 
white settler, was taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal 
Husbandry. However, the Luo squatters, like the landless Kipsigis in a sim-
ilar parcel of land, who were tilling the land, petitioned the government 
through Daniel Moi, then the vice president, and bought the land. How-
ever, the Kericho District Commissioner and the Kipsigis County Council 
refused to grant the Luo squatters land titles. These government officers, 
however, completed the subdivision and titling of land bought by the Kipsi-
gis. They argued that the land belong to the Kipsigis. The Luo squatters had 
paid more money for the land they wished to buy than the Kipsigis, how-
ever, the government had not only withheld their money, but also allowed 
Kalenjin warriors to attack them and kicked them out, as multi-party pol-
itics intensified.71
Moreover, observers of the violence of 1990s noted that the new wave 
of violence not only exceeded the elders’ mediation efforts, the tested in-
ter-communal conflict resolution mechanism, used to mitigate conflicts 
over cattle theft and land disputes. It also had other new attributes: the 
government security apparatuses were uncharacteristically too slow to in 
their response to the new wave of “cattle rustling or land clashes,” or were 
complicit in the attacks.72 The state was indifferent to the plight of the vic-
tims and hostile to any attempts at peace-making and humanitarian assis-
tance by the church or non-governmental organization.73
The attackers were not after cattle, but after evicting the non-Kalenjin. 
Paul Kimani, who was born in Kunyak in 1937 and knew no other home,”74 
told the Nation team “ these people are burning our houses and telling us to 
go back home. Which home do I go to? I know that my dead parents came 
from somewhere in Kiambu but this is my home.”75 Moreover, the ethnic 
hostilities had also spilled over into other locations within Kericho Dis-
tricts, namely tea plantations, hotels, and schools, were the Luos, perceived 
to be pro-FORD were threatened with eviction.76 Leaflets were circulating 
within the Rift Valley warned non-Kalenjins to leave.
70 Gerry oduor, “families fleeing”
71 Akiwumi report, 92-103
72 The Standard, “Tribal Clashes: where is state machinery, ” 10 January 1992.
73 Africa Watch
74 Nation Team, “Man speared to death as land feuds rage,” Daily Nation, 9 November 1991, p.1.
75 Nation Team, “Man speared to death as land feuds rage,” Daily Nation, 9 November 1991, p.1.
76 Kauli Mwatela, Kennedy Masibo and Caleb Atemi, “10 killed in more tribal fighting,” Daily 
Nation, 16 March 1992, p.1 and p.2
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The Human Rights Watch report also noted that the violence being 
perpetrated by the armed groups from Pokot community was different: 
“before they [the Pokot/Kalenjin] were only stealing cows, but now they 
also burning houses and killing people.”77 In Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia the 
perpetrators of the violence were using guns, bows and arrows.78 Although 
the perpetrators of this violence stole cattle from everyone, only the Buku-
su houses were being burnt.79
The Akiwumi Report noted that the government did not deploy the 
police in sufficient numbers that could stop the violence.80 Moreover, the 
government often selectively applied the law, arresting and prosecuting the 
opposition politicians and those who were defending themselves against 
the “Kalenjin attackers.” However, the whenever the “Kalenjin attackers” 
who were arrested were released without any charge. The government bi-
ases were also exacerbated by attempts by the Chief Justice Hancox to in-
timidate the lower courts handling most of these cases.81
The Kiliku report concluded that the violence experienced in the Rift 
Valley was political: it was “KANU fighting FORD.”82 The violence was mostly 
driven by the perceived political threats the re-introduction of multi-party 
politic posed to the Kanu regime and partly driven by rivalries over admin-
istrative posts in places like Molo. The politics of “political zoning,” that is, 
a process of defining a specific region, either as KANU zones or FORD zones, 
were key drivers of the violence.
The Kiliku report suggested that, in the Rift Valley province, the Ma-
jimbo debate had been understood as the establishment of mutually exclu-
sive ethnically defined regionalism. Kiliku reported that a Mr. Kurgat of 
Tarbo in Eldoret told the committee that “in the United Kingdom, the Scots 
lived in Scotland, the Welsh in Wales and the English in England and they 
just met for business in London.”83 However, the Kiliku report incongru-
ously concluded that some KANU politician and government officr could 
have been complicit in perpetration of the violence, however, neither the 
ruling party KANU nor the president Moi and his government bore any col-
lective responsibility for the violence.
77 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, p.29.
78 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, p.49.
79 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, p.30.
80 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 64.
81 Africa Watch, Divide and Rule, 69-70.
82 Amos Onyatta, “Uproar in House as Kiliku reads report,” The Standard, 25 September 1992.
83 Amos Onyatta, “Uproar in House,” p1 and p.12.
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The Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry
The Akiwumi Commission also reached a similarly incongruous conclu-
sion. The Akiwumi Commission was categorical that the violence was po-
litical. It meticulously investigated all the major incidences of violence, 
examined the official explanation and alibis, and recommended the pros-
ecution of KANU politicians, businessmen and government officer believed 
to have perpetrated the violence. However, the commission’s explanation 
of the violence as something driven by structurally unchanging cultural 
traits undermined the significance of its conclusion. The commission un-
critically appropriated the alibis, excuses of the ruling regime, KANU gov-
ernment. For example, the Commission argued that before 1991:
There existed in some cases, from time immemorial, clashes between var-
ious tribes including traditional enemies, in the country and even within 
clans in a given tribe. This clashes and their causes where relevant, will be 
taken into account in assessing the causes, objectives and circumstances of 
the tribal clashes that occurred in the country from 1991to 1998. The phrase 
‘tribal clashes’ within the context of what occurred during the period under 
consideration, and the political and economic development of Kenya and 
its advancement in modern civilization, can no longer be limited to the 
unsophisticated objectives of pre-colonial primitive wars between tribes.84
In instances, where the report resorts to ‘tradition,’ ‘culture,’ ‘tradi-
tional stock thieves,’ ‘customs,’ ‘tribe’ and ‘age-old cultural,’ it looks at cul-
ture or tradition as something as static, ahistorical, and essential markers 
of ethnic difference. It also understands culture and social relations as 
something “homogeneous, coherent and timeless.”85 Therefore, it falls for 
the propaganda value of the Moi regime’s uses of the label “tribal clashes,” 
when it invokes traditional enmity or “traditional way of life,” even as it 
acknowledges evidence that point to the deliberate acts of provocation as 
the trigger of inter-communal violence. Moreover, it references the coloni-
al administrators’ reports of 1960s to explain political and social relations 
of Kenyan communities in the 1990s.
Akiwumi report notes that violence at the Coast was more about elec-
tion than land. It was part and parcel of KANU’s wider strategy to divide the 
opposition along ethnic and racial at the Coast. Therefore, the contested 
beach plots were not targeted. It elides the significance of class in the Rift 
Valley case: land owned by Kenya’s multi-ethnic elite and the Multi-Na-
84 Government of Kenya, 2002: 21.
85 Lila Abu-Lughod, “Writing against culture,” in Henrietta L. Moore and Todd Sanders (eds.), 
Anthropology in Theory: Issues in Epistemology. Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 2014: 386-399.
MISR WP 24 Akoko.indd   34 15/10/2015   09:22
‘KITU KICHAFU SANA’: DANIEL ARAP MOI AND THE DIRTY BUSINESS OF DISMEMBERING KENYA’S BODY POLITIC
tional Companies in the Rift Valley, a category of land that, like its con-
tested Beach Plots in Mombasa, has not been targeted by all the waves of 
election-related violence.
Thus, violence was political. The KANU regime directed the violence 
against a population whose political choices it feared could tilt the balance 
of the electoral competition in favor of the opposition parties, especially 
the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD). The violence was pri-
marily political because it was part and parcel of KANU wider strategy of 
confining the politics of democracy and human rights within the urban 
areas and making it hard or prevent the emerging opposition political par-
ties from obtaining the statutory requirements for a presidential victory: by 
displacing thousands of peasants perceived to be pro-opposition, the KANU 
regime reduced the chances of a united opposition obtaining a simple ma-
jority vote out of all votes cast in all constituencies or even the statutory 
requirement of obtaining at least 25 percent of total votes cast in at least 5 of 
the 8 provinces of Kenya.
Arguably, the main motive of the KANU elite was not redistribution 
of land from below, even though the violence achieved this to a limited 
extent and diverted the inter-class conflict between the landless and large 
land owners, but the retention of state power, containing the threat of ma-
joritarism in a polity where ethnic consciousness and elite mediated po-
litical coalitions defines electoral victory. Indeed, as Kamungi points out, 
even though the existence of the internally displaced person justifies new 
resettlement schemes, “the Agricultural Development Corporation farms 
slated for resettlement of IDPs in 1995 were grabbed by politicians, business 
people and army officers and a small fraction of IDPs were settled in forests 
and swamps.”86 The settlement around Mara, contested by the Maasai, is a 
case in point.
The violence main aim was to stem the political threat posed by FORD. 
In the face of a strong pan-ethnic political movement, which brought to-
gether notable political elite from various ethnic groups, Daniel Moi re-ap-
propriated and deployed the political fears of Kenya Democratic African 
Union (KADU), at the dawn of Kenya’s independence: independence era 
politics of “advanced tribes” versus “backward tribes,” that was ostensibly 
represented by KANU and KADU, but reflected ethno-regional socio-eco-
nomic inequalities, was recast by KANU regime as the politics of ethnic 
domination, ‘big tribes’ versus ‘the small tribe,’ ostensibly represented by 
FORD and KANU, respectively. KANU ran against a divided opposition in the 
86 Kamungi, 2009: 352.
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1992 and 1997 presidential elections. Moi served the constitutionally man-
dated two terms of office, until 2002. In 2003, KANU’s candidate, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, lost to a united opposition, the National Rainbow Coalition, led 
by Mwai Kibaki. The 2002 presidential election has been the only election, 
since 1991, that was not only free of violence but also free and fair.
Conclusion
Contrary to the popular use of adjectives such as “tribal clashes” “ethnic 
clashes” or “land clashes,” the violence has never been solely about ethnic-
ity or land, even though historical land injustices has been invoked to ex-
plain it and its victims defined by ethnicity. More importantly, the violence 
has been political: its victims are determined by the nature of the Kalenjin 
and Maasai political elite alliances in a particular electoral contest. Ethnic 
groups whose elites are included or excluded in political parties or allianc-
es for capturing the presidency, in which the Kalenjin and Maasai elite are 
principal players, has been the key determinant of victims of the violence, 
except for the Kisii communities of the Rift Valley, who have been the tar-
geted in all the waves of the violence.
Unlike the other ethnic groups, who mostly vote a single block for 
parties that represent regional interests, the Kisii, the Meru and Luhya, 
have tended to vote for the main political parties in general elections. In 
the 1990s, the violence targeted ethnics groups whose elites had been mar-
ginalized the Daniel arap Moi’s regime, namely, the Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii, Lu-
hya and Teso. In 2007/8, the targets of the militia violence in the Rift Valley 
notably spared these ethnic groups except the Kikuyu, who were largely 
perceived to be pro- Mwai Kibaki led Party of National Unity. The party 
Orange Democratic Movement was an alliance of several ethnic groups, 
which notably included the Kalenjin and the Maasai, but largely excluded 
the Kikuyu. In 2013, the Jubilee Coalition, largely made up of the Kikuyu 
and the Kalenjin, brought the Kalenjin, Maasai and other pastoralist eth-
nic groups together. Politics in the Rift Valley was largely peaceful for all 
the ethnic groups. The Kalenjin and Maasai elite’s interests, more than any 
other factor, has been the key determinant of the course of the political 
violence in the Rift Valley.
Although the Rift Valley Province has been the epicenter of the po-
litical violence (Uasin Gishu, Eldoret, Burnt Forest, and Kuresoi) driven by 
politics of fear of ethnic domination, the Kalenjin community, an ethnic 
group that was constructed in response to such fears, voted overwhelming-
ly against the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Indeed, William Ruto and Dan-
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iel Moi, and some clergymen of the NO Campaign in the 2010 Referendum, 
notably led the opposition against the adaptation of a new constitutional 
order, arguably, the most significant political response to Kenya’s ethnic 
and land question. However, the majority of other Kenyans voted for the 
constitution and it was promulgated on the 27 August 2010.
Arguably, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, addresses Kenya’s ethnic 
question both as a response to potential National Question (ethno-regional 
nationalism- the Mombasa and Somali nationalism) and as social question 
(vertical and horizontal social inequalities).87 It addresses ethno-regional 
social economic inequality through a raft of measures: the creation of 47 
County governments, constitutional allocation of resources and equaliza-
tion funds, various provision on inclusion, and ethnic diversity. It attempts 
to redress the disadvantages of the biases of the past governments, and to 
balance social pluralism with individual rights. However, the current coun-
ty governments’ administrative boundaries, electoral system and the dom-
inance of particular ethnic groups within most of these counties, arguably, 
reify ethnic identity and identification.
Moreover, the Constitution of Kenya’s provisions on land and land 
policy has yielded more struggles over the control of land management 
bureaucracies, between the national and county government, than strug-
gles for equity and redistribution of land to the landless, the displaced and 
disposed. Similarly, while the constitution has progressive provision on 
ethnicity, but the Commission it mandates to superintend the ethnic and 
racial discrimination, is arguably, unequal to the task.
However, as Branch points out,88 the British counter insurgency strat-
egy has ensured that only moderate and pro-status quo leader ascend to 
the presidency in Kenya. However, the radicals may have their constitu-
tional moments. Whereas the Jubilee Coalition, the political party in pow-
er, is made up of the wealthy Kikuyu and Kalenjin elites, and largely sup-
ported by their respective ethnic groups across class, the Uhuru Kenyatta 
–William Ruto government has largely ignored the only serious attempt 
to deal with some of the issues that fuel the violence in the Rift Valley: the 
incumbent government has largely ignored the findings and the recom-
mendation of Kenya’s Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission.
87 Mkandawire, “From the National to the Social Question,” Transformations 69 (2009).
88 Branch, 2009.
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